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Response to Comments
T. VAIL PALMER, JR.
In the discussion of this paper at Powell House, one of the
sharpest points was made by Chris Downing. She accused me
of “playing a game” in my biblical interpretation. Since the
biblical materials are so diverse that any attempt to bring
coherent order out of them involves some sort of interpretive
game, she challenged all attempts to ground ethics on a biblical
starting-point.
I accept the truth of the charge. But the problem is far
deeper than even Chris Downing suggested. Not only in bib
lical interpretation, but also in the whole realm of theological,
ethical, and metaphysical speculation, there simply are no
universally agreed-on starting-points available. We have only
two options: to join the logical positivists in declaring all the
ology, ethics, and metaphysics to be nonsense; or to choose
some interpretive position as a starting-point and to play the
game of developing it into a model or theory, with all the
boldness of which our imagination is capable and with all the
tentativeness required by the recognition of our own human
fallibility. This game-playing is, of course, piifl of the quest
for truth. We not only construct models; we also engage in
dialogue, testing one another’s models by all of the many cri
teria which can he summarized as the tests of coherence and
adequacy.
Building on the assumption that the early Quakers were
on the right track, at least in matters of theology and ethics, I
have questioned both the intemal coherence of modern situa
tion ethics and its adequacy to that assumption. In the pro
cess, it has become clear that I am operating within a model of
biblical ethics which uses certain themes from Deuteronomy
and Matthew as keys to my interpretation and within an under-
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standing of the early Quakers as very close in their intention
to the Anabaptists.
Canby Jones makes it clear that he is working within
a model of Christian ethics which is much like my own
“Matthean-Anabaptist-Quaker” approach. He adds, from the
depths of his rich devotional life, an emphasis from the Psalms
which I often tend to overlook. Critical dialogue, then, will
have to wait until we see whether our similar theories bring us
out at the same point in terms of concrete application and
decision-making.
In contrast, Hugh Barbour is arguing for an ethics of con
text and response, rooted in a “Pauline-Lutheran-Quaker”
model. In the process, lie makes some points that I would also
have emphasized in a fuller exposition of my own position:
Christian ethics is, in the first instance, an ethics of grateful
response to God’s initiative, action, and grace. The mighty
acts of God and the covenant do form the central context for
our action; in Paul Pfuetze’s words, the testimonies are both
to and from Christ; I hope this was implied in my affirmation
of “the second sense of Lehmann’s contextualism.”
I believe Hugh Barbour has misunderstood me on a
couple of points. I did not set the Decalogue over against
love; I was arguing that the dimension of regularity provided
by the Ten Commandments was part of the definition of
covenant-love! When I gave my exposition of Kant’s ethics in
a discussion with Hugh Barbour and Isamu Nagami, it was not
for the purpose of showing the basis for my own ethics, but
rather was intended simply to clarify the difference between the
form of action and the goal of action as a locus for ethical
standards. Thus my “mixed ethics” is not a break-away from a
primarily formal, Kantian ethics. It is the other way around:
an ethics derived from the acts of God and the covenant has
something to say about motives, about the goals of action, and
about the form of action.
Hugh Barbour does not make it clear why he would prefer
that I went the whole way with the Pharisees (and Kant) into
a purely formal ethics of rules. Such an ethic might be logic
ally neater than a “mixed” ethics, but it would surely be far
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less adequate to the realities of life in the covenant-community
and to the richness of human personality.
Hugh Barbour rightly demands clarification of the relation
ship between the positive and negative principles in my ethics.
This problem is also implied in Paul Pfuetze’s opening para
graph: How do freedom and order, spontaneity and structure,
continuity and change sort themselves out in actual Christian
practice? The underlying positive principle is to be like God
in his mighty acts! In these acts he first freed a people from
slavery, and then himself took “the form of a servant.” This
principle comes first; but the principle is incomplete. A great
mighty act of God is yet to come. The biblical visions of the
City of God afford the church a glimpse into the nature of the
divine-human community which is God’s goal for our life, to
which our gaze is directed and to which, in part, the church’s
own life is already to conform. Yet the goal finally comes by
God’s action rather than by men’s. From our standpoint, the
route to the goal is obscure and broken. What we do have is
the context of the covenant community, within which we seek
and on occasion discover new applications of the basic principle
of servant-love. In mutual dialogue, as we responsibly face the
problems of the world, Christians discern new ways of respond
ing to God’s grace and tile needs of the neighbor. But our
leadings need to be checked. Not every new discovery is true
or right. The words which the covenant community understood
as given to it when “The LORD spoke with you face to face at
the mountain” (Deut. 5:4), and when he again “dwelt among
us, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14), and when again he
had “come to teach his people himself” (George Fox, Journal,
enable us to rule
p. 107), provide a few basic guidelines, which
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My ultimate question .o Hugh Barbour is this: Is he not
attempting to give us a Lutheran ethic under cover of Quaker
ism? As I read him, I keep asking, “Where do the testimonies
come in? Can we really have a Quaker ethics that does not
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affirm the testimonies as central?” The final implication of his
position is, indeed, that “we must live without an ethic.” That
is just the problem.
it is not quite so clear what sort of ethical “game” Paul
Pfuetze is trying to play. His emphasis on Quakerism as pri
marily a method for decision-making, his appeal to Brunner,
H. Richard Niebuhr, and Buber, and his insistence that “cer
tam things” are indeed ruled out, do not at first sight add up
to a clear ethical model. I suspect that he is primarily attempt
ing an internal critique of the coherence of my own interpreta
don of Quaker ethics.
I am not sure why Paul Pfuetze sees a problem in the rela
tiouship between the early Quaker tradition and “present day
conservative legalistic Friends.’ My point in emphasizing the
testimonies is precisely to provide a firm basis for disowning (!)
such positions as racism, betrayal of the peace testimony, eco
nomic exploitation, and the acceptance of “built-in institutional
covert violence.” Surely these are the real adversary in our
even in ourselves. In contrast, however much I dis
midst
with
Hugh Barbour’s contextualism or Paul Pfuetze’s
agree
apparent over-emphasis on Quakerism as a sheer ethical
method, our disagreements are at worst family quarrels within
a mutual quest for renewal and reconstruction of our vision.
I did grant that Fox made an exception to his rule against
smoking. All this proves is that early Friends had no inflexible
rule against smoking. The fact that one “rule” was flexible
and hence not a rule, does not logically imply that all the testi
monies were flexible non-rules. Although I would emphasize
the core-principles in the Quaker testimonies, rather than all
of the details, I suspect that, at their best even in our day, they
are not “merely eccentric” manners. Perhaps William Bacon
Evans did preach on “foolishness, foppery and finery” nearly
every time my wife wore her red coat to Meeting, but the
twinkle never left his eye; he spoke out of the depths of love,
not out of crotchetiness or eccentricity!
I agree that much traditional Christian theology has cen
tered around the two poles of creation and redemption. But I
believe contemporary biblical scholarship has thrown this view
—
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into question. it had necessarily involved the assumption that
Genesis is the center and key to the Old Testament. But the
evidence has become much clearer that Old Testament thought
takes Exodus as its center and starting-point. The book of
Genesis is simply an attempt to “read back” such Exodus
themes as the mighty acts of God and the covenant into a sort
of pre-history of Israel. Clearly, the escape from Egypt was an
act of divine redemption, not primarily an act of creation.
Thus the Exodus and the Christ-event, the two poles of bibli
cal theology, were both acts of redemption. The theme of
creation is secondary, derived from the ideas of redemption
and of the covenant. The creation-redemption polarity can
probably only be made central to Christian theology by sacri
ficing the biblical emphasis on the covenant.
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